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Abstract Before engaging in a group venture agents may require commit-
ments from other members in the group, and based on the level of acceptance
(participation) they can then decide whether it is worthwhile joining the group
effort. Here, we show in the context of Public Goods Games and using stochas-
tic evolutionary game theory modelling, which implies imitation and mutation
dynamics, that arranging prior commitments while imposing a minimal par-
ticipation when interacting in groups induces agents to behave cooperatively.
Our analytical and numerical results show that if the cost of arranging the
commitment is sufficiently small compared to the cost of cooperation, com-
mitment arranging behavior is frequent, leading to a high level of cooperation
in the population. Moreover, an optimal participation level emerges depending
both on the dilemma at stake and on the cost of arranging the commitment.
Namely, the harsher the common good dilemma is, and the costlier it becomes
to arrange the commitment, the more participants should explicitly commit to
the agreement to ensure the success of the joint venture. Furthermore, consid-
ering that commitment deals may last for more than one encounter, we show
that commitment proposers can be lenient in case of short-term agreements,
yet should be strict in case of long-term interactions.
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1 Introduction
Before engaging in a group venture individuals often secure prior commitments
from other members of the group, and based on the level of participation (i.e.
how many group members commit) they can then decide whether it is worth-
while joining the group effort (Nesse, 2001, Sterelny, 2012, Barrett, 2003).
Many group ventures can be launched only when the majority of the partic-
ipants commit to contribute to a common good (Cherry and McEvoy, 2013,
Chen and Komorita, 1994). A cooperative hunting effort (both in animals, such
as lions and some birds, and in humans) usually requires a sufficient number of
participants “on board” to embark (Stander, 1992, Alvard and Nolin, 2002).
While some international agreements require ratification by all parties before
entering into force, most (especially global treaties) require a minimum less
than the total number of negotiating countries (Barrett, 2003, Cherry and
McEvoy, 2013). In group or coalition formation in multi-agent systems, a suf-
ficient number of participants needs to agree on the terms of the agreement
for it to be binding (Ray, 2007, Hasan and Raja, 2013). In general, it appears
that the required participation level depends on the nature of the problem in
place. Here we investigate analytically and numerically whether commitment
strategies, in which players propose, initiate and honor a deal, evolve as viable
strategies for the evolution of cooperative behavior in the Public Goods Game
(PGG), while at the same time analyzing the effect of the participation level
and the transition from a single to multiple-rounds version of the game.
In a typical PGG, all players can choose whether to cooperate, contributing
an amount c to the public good, or to defect, taking advantage of the public
good without contributing to it (Hauert et al., 2007, Sigmund, 2010). The
total contribution is multiplied by a constant factor, r > 1, and is distributed
equally among all players. A group of cooperators hence do better than a
group of defectors, but defectors always have a better payoff in their group.
Only when r is smaller than the group size (denoted by N), does the PGG
represent a social dilemma, i.e. every individual player is better off defecting
than cooperating, no matter what the other players do, although in this case it
is the worst possible outcome for the group (Hauert et al., 2002). Evolutionary
game theory (EGT) models (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Sigmund, 2010)
predict the destruction of cooperation – famously known as ‘the tragedy of
commons’ (Hardin, 1968).
In our commitment extension to the PGG, agents have, before playing
the PGG, the option to propose other members in the group to commit to
contribute, where the proposers pay a personal cost , to make it credible.
If a sufficient number of the members commit (participation level F ), the
PGG is played. Otherwise, the commitment proposers refuse to play. Those
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who committed but then do not contribute have to compensate others at a
personal cost, δ. Further details of the game are provided in Section 3.
In the two-player setting (namely, the Prisoner’s Dilemma) the behavior of
proposing prior commitments has been shown to promote the evolution of co-
operation if the cost of arranging commitment  is sufficiently small compared
to the cost of cooperation (Han et al., 2013a, 2015b,c). But when larger groups
of actors are involved, decision-making becomes much more complex (Van Seg-
broeck et al., 2012, Han et al., 2012c, Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010, Duong and
Han, 2015, 2016). Instead of a clear, full commitment or, no-commitment, from
the co-player as in the two-player game, when moving to the multi-player de-
cision scenario of the PGG, there can be several possible intermediate degrees
of participation (as many as the size of the group, i.e. N). It is not clear which
minimal participation level would evolve in a the population given the settings
of the PGG.
To answer this question, we will distinguish N different participation levels
for the one-shot PGG, encoded in terms of commitment-proposing strategies,
COMPF where F ∈ {1, ..., N}. COMPF contributes c to the public good when
there are at least F players in the group (including herself) that agree or com-
mit to contribute; otherwise, the strategy refuses to play. Examples for such
a minimum membership requirement can be found in the creation of treaties
that address international environmental issues (Barrett, 2003, Cherry and
McEvoy, 2013) 1 or the formation of coalitions in multi-agent systems (She-
hory and Kraus, 1998, Shehory et al., 1998). These new strategies allow us to
investigate how the severity of the game (defined by r < N , where lower r
values correspond to a tougher PGG) and the parameters of the commitment
system ( and δ) influence the required participation level. Second, we examine
how strict, in case the PGG is repeated for multiple rounds R, these COMPF
players should be when they notice that among those that committed to con-
tribute, some of them did not honor the deal: should they immediately claim
the compensation or might it be worthwhile to be lenient and continue the
game? In that case how lenient should an agent be? Again we determine here
how the three parameters, r,  and δ, affect the answers to these questions.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we high-
light the research, both analytical and experimental, that are most closely
related to our work. In Section 3 the game structure is discussed in more de-
tail and the Evolutionary Game Theory methods used to obtain the results
are explained. The results section (Section 4) is divided into three parts. First,
a mathematical analysis is performed to determine under which conditions the
COMPF strategies are evolutionarily viable. Second, results are provided that
1 For example, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change required ratification by at least 55 parties prior to its entry into force in
February 2005. Similarly, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
required at least 11 countries to ratify it before it entered into force in 1989. While many
treaties require only a subset of affected parties to ratify for entry into force, some require all
parties to join. For example, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the North-East Atlantic required accession of all negotiating parties (Barrett, 2003).
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show what the required participation level in an agreement should be for co-
operation to thrive. Third, the results for multiple-round PGGs are presented.
Finally, a discussion of all the presented results and conclusions are provided
in Section 5.
2 Related Work
The problem of explaining the emergence of collective behavior has been
studied extensively from a wide range of research fields, including Anthro-
pology, Sociology, Economics, Evolutionary Biology, Psychology, and, more
recently, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Multi-agent Systems (MAS) (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981, West et al., 2007, Nowak, 2006b, Sigmund, 2010, Tuyls
and Parsons, 2007, Hofmann et al., 2011, Han et al., 2011, 2012b, Lerat et al.,
2013, Han et al., 2013b, Hasan and Raja, 2013, Ranjbar-Sahraei et al., 2014,
Airiau et al., 2014, Sasaki et al., 2015, Han, 2016, Han and Lenaerts, 2016).
The Public Goods Game (PGG) is a standard framework to study this prob-
lem, as it captures the tension between the benefit of mutual cooperation and
the temptation to exploit the efforts of others in a joint venture (Ostrom,
1990, Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000, Santos et al., 2008, Hauert et al., 2007, Sig-
mund et al., 2010, Van Segbroeck et al., 2012). Several mechanisms have been
proposed that promote the evolution of cooperation within the context of the
PGG (Nowak, 2006b, West et al., 2007, Sigmund, 2010), including (but not
limited to) kin and group selection (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006, West et al.,
2007), reputation and repeated interactions, networked reciprocity (Szolnoki
and Perc, 2010, Santos et al., 2008, Perc et al., 2013), and punishment/reward
(Szolnoki and Perc, 2013, 2012, Sigmund et al., 2001, Hauert et al., 2007, Szol-
noki and Perc, 2010). In this work, we study whether the behavior of proposing
prior agreements regarding posterior compensations can resolve the tension ob-
served within the PGG, without taking into account relatedness, reputation,
structured populations or repeated interaction effects. The focus on strategies
capable of creating agreements makes this work more closely linked with evo-
lution of minimal cognitive capabilities. We studied such strategies before in
the context of pair-wise interactions (Han et al., 2012b, 2013a, 2015c, Han,
2016). Yet, when moving from pair-wise to group interactions, the outcome is
more complex since there are more possible participation levels commitment
proposers can insist on. These levels play a crucial role regarding the effec-
tiveness of the mechanism, which cannot be seen in the pair-wise interaction
setting.
We recently performed a first analysis of commitments in a group interac-
tion setting (Han et al., 2015b), analyzing commitment strategies that follow
two different approaches when facing non-committers, i.e. those who do not
agree to contribute. Prior work showed that these defectors can be persis-
tent at higher initiation costs. Because PGG is by definition non-exclusive, it
may be costly to prevent the non-committing players from enjoying the public
goods without external measures (Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010). The article com-
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pared two different strategies: (i) AVOID, which specifies that the player does
not participate in the creation of the common good whenever there are non-
committers; (ii) RESTRICT, which has the capacity to impose boundaries (at
a cost) on the common good so that only those that have committed to make
it work have (better) access or that the benefit non-contributors can acquire
is reduced. The analysis reveals that RESTRICT, rather than AVOID, leads
to more favorable societal outcomes, in terms of contribution levels, especially
when the group size and/or the benefit of the PGG increase. The AVOID strat-
egy is equivalent to one of the strategies we investigate here: COMPF with the
participation level F being equal to the size of the group (F = N). The present
work investigates participation levels smaller than the group size, focussing on
how varying F affects the cooperation in the population and which level is
evolutionarily preferred. The current work complements the prior publication,
describing a novel, alternative approach to cooperation enhancement in the
PGG, as costly restriction measures may not always be possible and they may
take additional effort and time to implement (Ostrom, 1990). Furthermore,
the newly defined participation level factor allows us to extend the definition
of commitment from the one-shot PGG to its iterated version. That enables
us, for the first time, to show how agents would behave given the length of a
commitment deal; for instance, should they be more or less strict in terms of
the participation level from the co-players?
The research addressed in this article is directly related to the results pro-
duced by Van Segbroeck et al. (Van Segbroeck et al., 2012) where a N-person
direct reciprocity mechanism was analyzed in the context of a repeated PGG.
The authors considered strategies that cooperate only if the number of group
members that cooperated in the previous round reaches a certain threshold.
Although these threshold strategies resemble the conditional commitment pro-
posers as defined in our model, they are different in the same manner that our
work differs from punishment or reward strategies traditionally studied in the
context of the evolution of cooperation: The N-player direct reciprocity strate-
gies are reactive in the sense that they respond immediately to the previous
behavior of the opponents(Sigmund et al., 2001, Chen et al., 2015). Differently,
our commitment strategies with participation conditions strategically decide
on how to behave before the actual game is played. As a consequence, these
strategies can be investigated even in the context of the extended one-shot
PGG.
Several behavioral economic experiments on commitments in PGGs have
been performed, and our results are in close accordance with the outcome of
these experiments (Chen and Komorita, 1994, Cherry and McEvoy, 2013). For
example, high levels of cooperation were observed in a PGG experiment where
a binding agreement, which was enabled through a prior communication stage
among the members of the group, could be arranged before the PGG interac-
tion occurred (Chen and Komorita, 1994). The experiment also showed that
whenever a commitment deal is not binding or not enforced, corresponding to
a low compensation cost in our commitment model, defectors are widespread
and the contribution level is low. The main difference with this experimental
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setting is that players, once they agreed to commit, still have the possibility to
defect (even when they then have to pay a compensation); while in the experi-
ment, any participant that agrees to contribute is enforced to do so. Hence, the
experiments do not reveal the effect of varying the compensation cost, which
as we also show here, is a major factor in a commitment system. Our work
reveals that, whenever the compensation reaches a certain threshold, increas-
ing it does not lead to further improvement (in terms of cooperation levels). It
implies that, when designing laws (whether in real life or in a self-organizing
MAS), it is not necessary to have an infinitely large compensation or sanction
against law breakers; a sufficient, predefined, one is enough for a wide range
of situations.
Another commitment experiment (Cherry and McEvoy, 2013) takes the
form of a deposit and refund scheme (Sasaki et al., 2015): In this scheme,
players that agree to commit have to deposit an amount which will be refunded
only if they honor the commitment and contribute to the common good. The
main difference with our analysis is that the agreement is set up exogenously
by a third party instead of being implemented as a strategic behavior (i.e. it
is not an option to propose a commitment in the experiment). Nonetheless,
the outcome of the experiment revealed that whenever the deposit amount,
corresponding to the compensation cost in our model, is sufficiently high, the
contribution level is significant (Cherry and McEvoy, 2013). But again, they
considered only one value of the compensation cost, preventing us to compare
the effects of varying this essential feature. Furthermore, it is worth noting that
in both these experiments (Chen and Komorita, 1994, Cherry and McEvoy,
2013), the cost of setting up the commitment is always set to 0, thereby leading
to effortless and effective commitment strategies. But as we will show, this
cost is the decisive factor for the viability of commitment strategies as well
as the emerging participation level. In short, the current paper suggests that
further experiments are required to explore the effects of varying the essential
parameters driving commitments in group interactions, including the costs of
arranging commitment and of compensation.
Last but not least, there is a large literature on commitments in AI and
MAS (Schelling, 1990, Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998, Wooldridge and Jen-
nings, 1999, Harrenstein et al., 2007, Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010, Winikoff,
2007). These works focus on how to use commitment for regulating individual
and collective behaviors. They study how to formalize commitments and their
different aspects, such as norms and conventions, in a MAS. Our work hence
provides insights into the design of such self-organizing MAS when dealing
with group interactions. For instance, what are the appropriate actual degrees
of commitment one should require from group members leading to highest
levels of cooperation. In a similar manner, our research may also have im-
portant implications for the work on group and coalition formation (Shehory
and Kraus, 1998, Shehory et al., 1998), where a decision on such a formation
naturally depends on the number of agents agreeing with the terms of the for-
mation (Ray, 2007, Sugawara, 2011, Hasan and Raja, 2013). In turn, as these
AI and MAS works focus more on the formalization of more complex decision
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making aspects, such as in arranging an agreement, they provide us with more
sophisticated extensions to our current commitment-organising mechanisms.
For instance, in (Hasan and Raja, 2013) the authors formalize commitment as
a device to incentivise other players in a structured population to form coali-
tions within which they can enjoy mutual cooperation. Agents play an iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with their neighbors and offer commitments to their
wealthiest neighbors in order to form coalitions. The commitment mechanism
is implemented similar to our model (Han et al., 2012b, 2013a). The authors
analyze the conditions regarding network structure and payoff configurations
under which an optimal coalition is achieved, with highest levels of coopera-
tion.
In (Schelling, 1990, Harrenstein et al., 2007), different forms of complex
commitments are described, such as commitments conditional on other play-
ers’ commitments and actions. The players do not act or commit simultane-
ously and it is strategically important to take into account the order of making
a commitment. In the current PGG framework, commitments are made simul-
taneously and agents are not aware of each others’ commitments (at least the
non-proposing ones). It might be interesting to relax this requirement in fu-
ture work. More complex approaches to designing a commitment or agreement
deal are also extensively studied in coalition formation (Ray, 2007, Shehory
and Kraus, 1998, Shehory et al., 1998), especially when the terms of an agree-
ment must be negotiated by the coalition members before being enacted.
3 Models and Methods
3.1 Commitment in Public Goods Games
As already discussed in the introduction we examine here the evolution of
commitment strategies in the context of the PGG. A commitment strategy is
defined as follows (see also Figure 1): Before playing the PGG, the agent or
player proposes other members in the group to commit to contribute c, pay-
ing a personal cost , corresponding to the cost of establishing the agreement.
When a sufficient number of the participants commit, the PGG is played.
Otherwise, a commitment proposer refuses to play the PGG. Those who com-
mitted but then do not contribute, i.e. they defect, have to compensate others
at a personal cost, δ. Yet, how many participants have to commit so that
the PGG is played? And how will the parameterisation of the extended PGG
influence the level of participation requested by the commitment proposers?
With a fixed group size N , there are N possible participation levels (i.e.
how many players in the group agree to contribute, including the proposer),
where we identify this participation by F ∈ {1, ..., N}. We hence denote by
COMPF the corresponding commitment proposing strategy that contributes
c if there are at least F players (including herself) in the group that agree to
contribute; otherwise, the strategy refuses to play, resulting in a zero payoff for
all group members. Note also that the results remain equivalent when the game
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play 
PGG
N players
play 
PGG
¬ play
#A ≥ F #A < F
#P=0#P ≥ 1
#P = num. proposers
#A = num. committers
ε, δ
Fig. 1 Structure of the PGG with commitments. When there are no proposers among the
N players, the original PGG is played (node 5). When there are proposers COMPF (node
2), there need to be a sufficient number of acceptors (including the proposers themselves)
(node 3), otherwise the game is not played and everyone obtains 0 payoff (node 4). In the
former case, the PGG is played but proposers pay the setup cost  and those that defect in
the PGG (whether they are proposers or acceptors) will have to pay a compensation δ.
A ¬A
¬PP
C D
A ¬A
DD DC C C
2nd decision
1st decision
3rd decision
C DFAKE
COM
P S2 S3 S4 S7
Fig. 2 Strategy taxonomy. There are three different decisions: 1) before the PGG, whether
to propose a commitment deal or not; 2) upon receiving a proposal, whether to accept or
reject it; and finally, 3) whether to cooperate or defect in the PGG itself. That leads to eight
possible strategies, where four of them can be excluded due to being dominated. Hence, four
strategies that are unconditional on the presence of a commitments are named: COMP, C,
D, FAKE.
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is still played and COMPF defects whenever there are not enough committers,
as that would result in the same outcome of zero payoff for everyone in the
group.
The space of possible strategies, which do not condition on the presence
of a commitment, is determined by three decisions: before the PGG, whether
to propose a commitment deal or not; upon receiving a proposal, whether to
accept or reject it; and finally, whether to cooperate or defect in the PGG
itself. As shown in previous models (Han et al., 2013a, 2015b), some unrea-
sonable strategies can be excluded as they will get eliminated anyway. Namely,
the strategies that cooperate in the game but will reject commitment propos-
als by others (i.e. S3 and S7 strategies in Figure 2) and the strategies that
propose an agreement but then defect in the game (i.e. S2 and S4 strategies
in Figure 2), independent of whether they accept another player’s proposal
or not. The former ones are willing to cooperate, and thus should also agree
to commit when being asked to since they prefer to cooperate anyway. Ad-
ditionally, a positive compensation is guaranteed without having to pay the
cost of arrangement. The latter ones should not propose commitments while
intending to defect, as they would lose the cost of arranging the commitment
and moreover have to compensate the other players. Figure 2 summarizes the
taxonomy of the possible strategies.
Besides the unconditional strategies, we also include in our model a strat-
egy that behaves conditionally on the presence of a commitment deal (see
the FREE strategy below), which appeared to be the main obstruction for
commitment strategies to evolve (Han et al., 2013a, 2015b).
Summarizing, we will examine the evolutionary dynamics of five strategies:
i) The COMPF strategies with different levels F of participation, with F ∈
{1, ..., N};
ii) Traditional unconditional contributors (annotated by C), who always com-
mit when being proposed a commitment deal, contribute whenever the
PGG is played, but do not propose commitment;
iii) Unconditional non-contributors (annotated by D), who do not accept com-
mitment, defect when the PGG is played, and do not propose commitment;
iv) Fake committers (annotated by FAKE), who accept a commitment pro-
posal yet do not subsequently contribute whenever the PGG is actually
played. These players assume that they can exploit the commitment propos-
ing players without suffering the consequences; and
v) Commitment free-riders (annotated by FREE), who defect unless being
proposed a commitment, which they then accept and cooperate subse-
quently in the PGG. In other words, these players are willing to contribute
when a commitment is proposed but are not prepared to pay the cost of
setting it up.
The strategies are randomly sampled from a well-mixed, finite population
of a constant size Z, which consists of players adhering to one of the five
commitment proposing strategies COMPF (1 ≤ F ≤ 5), C, D, FREE or the
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FAKE strategy (i.e. nine strategies in total). In each interaction, N agents are
randomly selected from the population for playing the PGG.
Focal Opponent Payoff Payoff
strategy i strategy j Πij constraints
COMPF1 COMPF2 rc− c− N ∀F1, F2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}
with F1 6= F2
COMPF C rc− c− k ∀F ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and
FREE k focal strategies with 1 ≤ k ≤ N
COMPF D
krc
N
− c− 
k
∀F ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and
k focal strategies with N ≥ k ≥ F
0 otherwise (i.e. F > k)
COMPF FAKE
krc
N
− c− 
k
∀F ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and
+
(N−k)δ
k
k focal strategies with 1 ≤ k ≤ N
C COMPF rc− c ∀F ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and
C k focal strategies with 1 ≤ k ≤ N
D
C FAKE
(
rk
N
− 1
)
c k focal strategies with 1 ≤ k ≤ N
FREE
FREE COMPF rc− c ∀F ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and
k focal strategies with 1 ≤ k < N
0 otherwise (i.e. k = N)
D COMPF
(N−k)rc
N
∀F ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and
k focal strategies with N − k ≥ F
0 otherwise (i.e. N − k < F )
FAKE COMPF
(N−k)rc
N
− δ ∀F ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and
∀k with 1 ≤ k < N
0 otherwise (i.e. k = N)
D,
FAKE or C rk
N
c k focal strategies with 1 ≤ k < N
FREE
0 otherwise (i.e. k = N)
D, D,
FAKE or FAKE or 0
FREE FREE
Table 1 Specification of the strategy payoffs. Fi or F refers to the number of other players
to commit to the PGG, including the strategy itself. N is the group size and k (N − k) is
the number of focal (opponent) strategy players in the group. The parameter F plays an
important role in groups where the non-committing players D are present as the commitment
player will only accept to play when at least F in the group agree to contribute, namely,
an amount c; r is the PGG multiplication factor, typically r < N ;  and δ are respectively
the cost of setting up the commitment and the compensation that needs to be paid when a
player dishonors the commitment.
Table 1 lists the payoffs each strategy receives when encountering specific
other strategies. We denote by Πij(k) and Πji(k) the payoffs of a strategist of
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type i and j, respectively, when the random sampling consists of k players of
type i and (N − k) players of type j. Next to providing the well-known pay-
offs for the typical PGG strategies the table specifies also for every COMPF
strategy as well as the FREE and FAKE strategies how their payoff is deter-
mined. The first column captures the first strategy and the second the list of
opponent strategies. These payoffs are used in the Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT) methods, which are discussed in detail in the next section.
3.2 Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations
Both the analytical and numerical results obtained here use Evolutionary
Game Theory methods for finite as opposed to infinite well-mixed populations
(Nowak et al., 2004, Imhof et al., 2005, Sigmund, 2010). Differently from the
infinitely large population settings in which the deterministic replicator dy-
namics equation is adopted to model the population dynamics (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998), the finite population approach uses a Moran process (Nowak,
2006a), a type of birth-death process that incorporates random replacement
of one individual by the offspring of another individual (selection) with the
offspring having the possibility to adopt the behavior of the parent or to pick
a random alternative (mutation). The first mechanism eliminates strategies
either randomly or in a fitness proportionate manner (exploitation) and the
second mechanism provides the means for novel strategies to appear in the
population (exploration) (Traulsen et al., 2009). Different from the dynamics
in infinitely large populations, which can be characterized by stable equilib-
rium points where multiple strategies may co-exist, the stochasticity (i.e. the
random replacement) in a finite population will, given enough time, drive the
population to a homogeneous state, wherein all agents use the same strategy,
as long as the state is reachable (Nowak, 2006a). This homogenous state might
be escaped only via mutation, as once all agents adopt the same strategy no
change to the population strategic composition can be obtained otherwise.
Nonetheless, any state is reachable from any other state, since there is always
a non-zero probability that an agent imitates another agent’s strategy2 if the
influence of the game payoff on the fitness is not infinitely large (see the Fermi
function below). In general, the finite population dynamics defined by the
Moran process allow one to characterise the probabilities of moving between
the homogeneous population states and how often each homogeneous state is
visited in the long run (see details of the Markov process below). For a nice
illustration of the difference between the two approaches see some examples
in (Imhof et al., 2005) where the approaches were used to analyze strategies
in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Finite population dynamics have received
increasing attention over the years as it has been shown to be successful in
explaining different realistic observations in the study of the evolution of co-
operation (Nowak et al., 2004, Imhof et al., 2005, Hauert et al., 2007, Traulsen
2 This imitation process is equivalent to the selection in the birth-death process described
above.
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and Hauert, 2009) as well as having the capacity to elegantly reproduce results
from behavioral experiments (Rand et al., 2013, Zisis et al., 2015).
In the current setting, an agent’s payoff represents its fitness or social
success, and the evolutionary dynamics are driven by social learning (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998, Sigmund, 2010, Rendell et al., 2010), whereby the more
successful agents tend to be imitated more often by the others. In the current
work, imitation is modeled through the widely used pair-wise comparison rule
(Traulsen et al., 2006), which assumes that an agent A with fitness fA adopts
the strategy of another agent B with fitness fB with probability given by the
Fermi function 3, (
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
)−1
.
The parameter β represents the ‘imitation strength’ or ‘intensity of selection’,
i.e., how strongly the agents base their decision to imitate on the fitness differ-
ence (fB − fA). For β = 0, we obtain the limit of neutral drift – the imitation
decision is random. For large β, imitation becomes increasingly deterministic.
It is noteworthy, especially for those who are familiar with other learning lit-
erature, that this parameter plays a similar role as the temperature factor in
Boltzmann exploration mechanism usually used in Reinforcement Learning to
balance between exploitation and exploration (Bloembergen et al., 2015). In-
deed, as exploration is introduced below, β balances between greedily mimicing
more successful interaction partners and randomly switching to the alterna-
tives available in the population.
As this imitation dynamics only work with the strategies available in the
population, novel behaviors can only be explored through mutation (Traulsen
et al., 2009). In the evolutionary process, one assumes that, with a certain
mutation probability µ, agents switch randomly to one of the potential strate-
gies instead of imitating another agent (which now occurs with the probability
1 − µ). Mutation hence seeds the population with new strategies, providing
them the possibility to invade (when they are more successful than the resi-
dent strategy). As such it provides an additional way of exploring the strategy
space.
Given the previous components, the population dynamics can be described
by a Markov chain, for which the stationary distribution characterizes the av-
erage time the population spends in each of monomorphic end state consisting
of only one strategic type. For arbitrary mutation probabilities, this stationary
distribution is cumbersome to compute analytically as one has to deal with
multiple new mutants at the same time (Hauert et al., 2007, Traulsen et al.,
2009). In the limit of small mutation rates (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2005, Imhof
et al., 2005, Hauert et al., 2007), any newly occurring mutant in a homogeneous
population will fixate or become extinct long before the occurrence of the next
mutation. Hence, the evolutionary dynamics will proceed with, at most, two
strategies in the population, allowing one to describe the behavioral dynamics
3 See (Traulsen and Hauert, 2009) for some alternative approaches to modelling social
dynamics in finite population settings.
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by a Markov chain, in which each state corresponds to a monomorphic popula-
tion, whereas the transition probabilities are given by the fixation probability
of a single mutant (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2005, Imhof et al., 2005). This ap-
proach has been proven useful for explaining different realistic observations in
the study of the evolution of cooperation (Nowak et al., 2004, Hauert et al.,
2007, Han et al., 2012b), and for generating results close to real experimental
data (Rand et al., 2013, Zisis et al., 2015). Below we describe how the fixation
probabilities and the stationary distribution are determined analytically.
Payoffs over group samplings
In finite populations, the groups engaging in a PGG are given by multivariate
hypergeometric sampling. For transition between two pure states (small muta-
tion), this reduces to sampling (without replacement) from a hypergeometric
distribution (Hauert et al., 2007, Sigmund, 2010). Namely, in a population of
size Z with x individuals of type i and Z − x individuals of type j, the prob-
ability to select k individuals of type i and N − k individuals of type j in N
trials is (Hauert et al., 2007)
H(k,N, x, Z) =
(
x
k
)(
Z − x
N − k
)
(
Z
N
) .
Recall that Πij(k) and Πji(k) denote the payoff of a strategist of type i and
j, respectively, when the random sampling consists of k players of type i and
N − k players of type j (as derived above). Hence, in a population of x i-
strategists and (Z − x) j-strategists, the average payoffs to i and j strategists
are (Hauert et al., 2007, Sigmund, 2010):
Pij(x) =
N−1∑
k=0
H(k,N − 1, x− 1, Z − 1) Πij(k + 1)
=
N−1∑
k=0
(
x− 1
k
)(
Z − x
N − 1− k
)
(
Z − 1
N − 1
) Πij(k + 1),
Pji(x) =
N−1∑
k=0
H(k,N − 1, x, Z − 1) Πji(k)
=
N−1∑
k=0
(
x
k
)(
Z − 1− x
N − 1− k
)
(
Z − 1
N − 1
) Πji(k).
(1)
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Now, the probability to change the number k of agents using strategy i by ±1
in each time step can be written as
T±(k) =
Z − k
Z
k
Z
[
1 + e∓β[Pij(k)−Pji(k)]
]−1
, (2)
with T+ corresponding to an increase from k tot k+ 1 and T− corresponding
to the opposite. The fixation probability of a single mutant with a strategy i
in a population of (N − 1) agents using j is given by (Traulsen et al., 2006,
Karlin and Taylor, 1975, Fudenberg and Imhof, 2005, Imhof et al., 2005)
ρj,i =
1 + Z−1∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
T−(j)
T+(j)
−1 . (3)
In the limit of neutral drift (i.e. β = 0), ρB,A equals the inverse of population
size, 1/Z.
Considering a set {1, ..., q} of different strategies, these fixation probabili-
ties determine a transition matrix M = {Tij}qi,j=1, with Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(q − 1)
and Tii = 1−
∑q
j=1,j 6=i Tij , of a Markov chain. The normalized eigenvector as-
sociated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed of M provides the stationary
distribution described above (Karlin and Taylor, 1975, Fudenberg and Imhof,
2005, Imhof et al., 2005), describing the relative time the population spends
in a configuration with only one of the strategies.
Risk-dominance condition
An important analytical criteria to determine the evolutionary viability of a
given strategy is whether it is risk-dominant with respect to other strategies
(Nowak, 2006b, Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010). Namely, one considers which
selection direction is more probable: an i mutant fixating in a homogeneous
population of agents playing j or a j mutant fixating in a homogeneous pop-
ulation of agents playing i. When the first is more likely than the latter, i is
said to be risk-dominant against j (Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010), which holds
for any intensity of selection and in the limit of large population size Z when
N∑
k=1
Πij(k) ≥
N−1∑
k=0
Πji(k). (4)
4 Results
4.1 Constraints on the evolutionary viability of COMPF
In order to assess whether and when the commitment proposing behavior can
be a viable strategy for the evolution of cooperation we first derive conditions
for which COMPF are risk-dominant against other strategies in the population
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Fig. 3 (a) Stationary distribution and transition probabilities in a population of nine
strategies, including five types of COMPF and the other four strategies. The black arrows
identify the transitions that are stronger than neutral, which is ρN = 1/Z. The dashed lines
denote neutral transitions. Also, different types of COMPF , within the pentagon, are neutral
among each other. They behave equivalently when facing FAKE, FREE and C players.
When playing with D, there are transitions from D to COMP3 , COMP4 and COMP5 , but
it is reversed for COMP1 . (b) Cooperation and (c) commitment levels in the population of
nine strategies, as a function of  and r. Cooperation level corresponds to the sum of the
frequencies of C and all COMPF strategies. Commitment level is the total frequency of all
COMPF . In both cases, the smaller the cost of arranging commitment (i.e. the smaller
), the higher level of cooperation and commitment in the population. Furthermore, the
cooperation level also increases with r. Parameters: In all panels, N = 5, Z = 100, δ = 2;
β = 0.25. In panel (a): r = 4;  = 0.25.
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(Nowak, 2006b, Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010). This derivation requires us to
combine the information in Table 1 and Equation (4).
1. COMPF is risk-dominant against FREE when
N∑
k=1
(rc− c− /k) ≥ (N − 1)(rc− c), (5)
which can be simplified to
 ≤ c(r − 1)
HN
, where HN =
N∑
k=1
1/k 4. (6)
2. COMPF is risk-dominant against FAKE if
N∑
k=1
(
(
rk
N
− 1)c+ Nδ − 
k
− δ
)
≥
N−1∑
k=1
(
r(N − k)
N
c− δ
)
, (7)
which can be simplified to
δ ≥ (N − r)c
NHN−1
+
HN
NHN−1
 (8)
Note that both conditions do not depend on the participation level F .
3. COMPF is risk-dominant against D if
 ≤
(
r + F −N − 1
HN −HF−1
)
c (9)
Combining these three conditions, one can see that COMPF is risk-dominant
against all three defecting strategies when δ satisfies Equation (8) and  is
bounded as follows
 ≤ min
{
r + F −N − 1
HN −HF−1 ,
r − 1
HN
}
· c. (10)
These conditions can be understood intuitively. For a successful commitment,
the cost of arranging the commitment needs to be justified with respect to the
benefit of mutual cooperation, i.e. (r−1)c, as well as a sufficient compensation
is to be arranged. Moreover, the necessary condition for the cost, specified in
Equation (10), to hold is r + F ≥ N + 1. Since N > r it implies that F ≥ 2.
That said, COMP1 can never be risk-dominant or viable against defectors.
Commitment proposers should initiate the PGG only when there is at least
one other player, apart herself, agreeing to commit.
This analytical observation is corroborated by the numerical computation
of the transition probabilities and stationary distribution (see Methods in the
4 It is known that 0.577215 < Hn − logn ≤ 1 (Knuth, 2011). Using these inequalities
we provide, in the Appendix, some further simplifications of the analytical formulas that
include HN which are presented throughout this results section.
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previous section) in Figure 3a. Note the transitions between different types of
COMPF players and D. There are transitions from D to COMP3 , COMP4
and COMP5 , but it is reversed for COMP1 . No transitions between COMP2
and D are shown since they are both weaker than neutral, though the one
from COMP2 to D is stronger than the opposite one. All COMPF behave
equivalently to each other when facing FAKE, FREE and C players, with the
same transition probabilities from and to the three latter strategies. There
are cycles from C to defecting strategies and back to certain commitment
proposing strategies, namely, COMP3 , COMP4 and COMP5 .
Note that the risk-dominance conditions are derived in the limit of large
population sizes Z. It is therefore interesting (and possible) to analyze these
conditions when the group size N →∞ (see again Equation 4). In Appendix
we provide detailed analysis for this. Apart from conclusions that are obtained
from direct application of taking the limit of the right-hand sides in the in-
equalities (8) and (10), we obtained necessary asymptotic conditions for the
multiplication factor r(N), the cost of arranging commitment (N), and the
compensation δ(N), all as a function of N , for which COMPF can be risk-
dominant against all the defective strategies, as follows
1. r(N) satisfies that r(N) = Ω(logN)), i.e.
lim
N→∞
r(N)
logN
> 0; and
2. (N) grows at most as fast as r(N)logN when N →∞; and
3. δ(N) grows at least as fast as (N)N when N →∞.
4.2 Emergence of cooperation and sufficient participation levels
To provide further understanding on the viability of COMPF in dealing with
defectors and free-riders, we compute the stationary distributions for a range
of values of the commitment cost  and the multiplication factor r, see Figures
3b and 3c. The results show that, when the cost of arranging the commit-
ment is sufficiently small compared to the cost of cooperation, commitment
arranging behavior is frequent leading to a high level of cooperation in the
population. We plot the total levels of cooperation and commitment in this
population (where cooperation level is the sum of the frequencies of C and of
all the COMPF strategies; and commitment level is the sum of frequency of
each COMPF ). We can see that in both cases, the smaller the cost of arranging
commitment (i.e. the smaller ), the higher level of cooperation and commit-
ment in the population. Furthermore, the cooperation level also increases when
the dilemma becomes less harsh, i.e. with increasing r. The contour lines of
 ∈ [0.25, 0.3] mark the transition between more and less than 50% of coop-
eration and commitment in the PGG. Our additional numerical results (see
Figure 7 in Appendix) demonstrate that these results are robust for different
values of compensation cost and group size.
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Fig. 4 (a) Average individual payoff in the population of nine strategies, as a function of
 and r. Similar to the cooperation level, the smaller the cost of arranging commitment (i.e.
the smaller ), the higher the average individual payoff in the population. It also increases
with r. (b) Average individual payoff in the population of nine strategies in comparison
with that in the population of two strategies C and D, for varying r. For a reasonable , the
average individual payoff (hence also the population total payoff or welfare) in the former
population is significantly greater than that in the latter one. For very high values of , it is
reverse when r is high. Parameters: In both panels, N = 5, Z = 100, δ = 2; β = 0.25.
One can easily determine the effect of commitment on the average pay-
off and compare that to the case where commitment is absent. In the latter
case, as commitment is absent there is only one decision the players need to
make, which is whether to cooperate or defect in the PGG. Hence, we have
only two possible strategies C (always cooperate) and D (always defect). In
Figure 4a, we plot the average individual payoff when commitment is present,
as a function of  and r. This average is calculated by weighting the payoff
in each monomorphic state of the Markov chain by its frequency in the sta-
tionary distribution. Namely, the average individual payoff in each COMPF
state is (rc − c − /N), in C state is (rc − c), and in each defective strategy
state (i.e. FREE, D and FAKE) is 0. One can observe in the figure, on one
hand, that, similarly to the cooperation level, the smaller the cost of arranging
commitment (i.e. the smaller ) and the higher the multiplication factor of the
PGG (i.e. r), the higher the average individual payoff in the population. On
the other hand, for a reasonable , the average individual payoff when com-
mitment is present is significantly larger than when it is absent (see Figure
4b), demonstrating that the introduction of commitment not only improves
the level of cooperation but, as a consequence, the overall population welfare.
As was shown in Figure 3a, the participation level plays a determining
role in the evolutionary viability of the commitment proposing strategies, in
relation to their ambition to induce cooperation in the population. We de-
termine now in Figure 5 the appropriate or minimal participation level that
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Fig. 5 (a) Average level of commitment among commitment proposing strategies and (b)
optimal commitment strategy (denoted by F ), as a function of r and , in a population of
the nine strategies. There is an intermediate value of F for which commitment proposers are
most frequent. The larger the cost of arranging commitment, , and the harsher the PGG
dilemma (i.e. the lower r), the higher F  is and a higher average number of committers are
required to play the game (i.e. the stricter COMPF should be). Optimal threshold F
 as a
function of  and δ, for (c) r = 2.5 and (d) r = 4.0. There is an intermediate value F  where
the highest frequency is achieved, and the higher , the higher F  becomes. Moreover, given
the cost of arranging commitment, the optimal commitment threshold does not depend on
the compensation δ. Parameters: In all panels: N = 5, Z = 100, β = 0.25. In panels (a) and
(b): δ = 6.
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Fig. 6 (a) Average F ′ level in the population among commitment proposing strategies and
(b) optimal F ′ level (with the highest frequency), as a function of r and R, in a population
of all types of COMPF ,F ′ and the other four strategies. Parameters: N = 5, Z = 100;
 = 0.25, δ = 20; β = 0.25.
ensures sufficient frequencies of the commitment proposer and cooperation,
for different values of the most relevant parameters. The results show that
the participation level depends both on the dilemma at stake and the cost
of arranging the commitment. Namely, the harsher the dilemma (i.e. small r)
and the costlier the commitment arrangement (i.e. bigger ), the more agents
need to accept to contribute in the PGG in order for commitment proposers
to invest in the common good themselves (see Figures 5a and 5b). Figure 5b
also reveals that for a given situation there is an optimal threshold (F ) that
varies most strongly with the severity of the dilemma. Moreover, given the cost
of arranging commitments, this optimal commitment threshold is (almost) in-
dependent of the compensation δ (see Figures 5c and 5d). This observation is
robust for a predefined r. These results also imply that  is the essential pa-
rameter in a group commitment system, determining which participation level
is required to ensure high levels of cooperation. Indeed, as shown in Figure 7
in Appendix—where we plot the total frequency of the commitment propos-
ing strategies as a function of  and δ—when δ reaches a certain threshold,
increasing it does not lead to notable improvement.
4.3 Lenience in long-term commitments
Suppose now that commitments may last more than 1 round (denoted by
R > 1) 5. When facing FAKE players who commit but then do not contribute,
5 “Delayed-return systems in all their variety (for almost all human societies are of this
type) have basic implications for social relationships and social groupings: they depend
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COMPF can choose to take immediately the compensation as stated in the
agreement thereby ceasing the group interaction for the rest of the commitment
time (R−1). Yet, the commitment player may see that although the expected
number F was not attained, there is still sufficient participation to make it
worthwhile to continue for the remaining rounds. The model discussed so far
can be easily extended to incorporate this kind of behavior. The question then
becomes for which parameters the COMPF players can be lenient and for
which conditions they need to be strict.
The model is extended to incorporate such behavior by adding another
threshold F ′ (1 ≤ F ′ ≤ N) saying that, as long as the number of contributors
in the group is at least F ′, COMPF ,F ′ will not demand the compensation
(thereby ceasing the interactions) and continue to interact in the current group.
We compare all types of COMPF ,F ′ with different values of F and F
′ (i.e.
N2 of them) within a population of these strategies with the other four non-
proposing commitment strategies (i.e. 29 strategies in total). To understand
the evolutionary viability of COMPF ,F ′ and to calculate the stationary distri-
butions we need to consider how this increase of complexity to the strategies
affects the payoff values listed in Table 1 (note that we now calculate payoffs
averaged over all rounds):
– The payoffs between two different types of COMPF ,F ′ are the same as the
payoffs between two different types of COMPF in the one-shot game (i.e.
rc− c− N ) because they all commit and cooperate in all the rounds.
– The interactions between COMPF ,F ′ on one hand, and C, D and FREE,
on the other hand, do not depend on the parameter F ′ as they all behave
the same in all the R rounds (C and FREE commit and cooperate in all
the rounds; while, in case of D, the game is either not formed in the first
place when there are not sufficient committers in the group or when it is
otherwise formed, it stays the same as D players do not commit in the first
place – hence no compensation can be enforced). Hence, the payoffs for all
these pairs are identical to those in Table 1.
– Only the payoffs for each COMPF ,F ′ strategy when interacting with FAKE
remain to be determined. If k ≥ F ′, COMPF ,F ′ will not demand the com-
pensation even when FAKE committed and does not contribute. Hence,
ΠCOMPF,F′ ,FAKE(k) = ΠCOMPF ,FAKE(k) and ΠFAKE ,COMPF,F′ (k) =
ΠFAKE,COMPF (k). Otherwise, i.e. if k < F
′, only the first round takes
place and then the commitment is broken as COMPF ,F ′ will demand im-
mediate compensation from FAKE players. Hence, ΠCOMPF,F′ ,FAKE(k) =
1
RΠCOMPF ,FAKE(k) and ΠFAKE ,COMPF,F′ (k) =
1
RΠFAKE,COMPF (k).
The results as visualized in Figure 6, show that for increasing R (i.e. the
longer the commitment lasts), the stricter COMPF ,F ′ should be when there
is an agreement in place, requiring more contributors in the group to decide
to continue to play. Concretely, take for instance the results in Figure 6 for
for their effective operation on a set of ordered, differentiated, jurally-defined relationships
through which crucial goods and services are transmitted. They imply binding commitments
and dependencies between people.” Quoted from (Woodburn, 1982)
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 = 0.25: To set up the agreement, different starting participation levels F
are necessary depending on the severity of the game (see Figures 5a-b). For
instance, for r = 3, a commitment proposer should play the PGG if only three
other players accept to commit (or 2.5 additional players on average). Taking
this result, we can see in Figure 6 that even when starting out more strict,
the proposer can be lenient towards the actual level of participation as long as
the number of rounds is low (in this case R < 10): Only when the number of
rounds becomes bigger than 40 will she need to be as strict as at the start of
the game (i.e. F = F ′ = 4). Notice that a rather high δ (namely, equal 20) is
used in Figure 6 to ensure a sufficient average compensation cost for varying
R, though our additional analysis shows the results are qualitatively the same
when varying δ. Furthermore, we see the same tendency when computing the
average frequency of F ′ in the population (as can be seen in Figure 6a).
5 Conclusions
We have provided a new evolutionary game theory model, which shows that ar-
ranging prior commitments in multiagent group interactions, not just pair-wise
ones, provides a pathway towards the evolution of cooperation in the typical
Public Goods Game (PGG). Our analytical and numerical results clearly ex-
hibit that if the cost of arranging commitment is sufficiently small compared to
cost of cooperation, then commitment arranging behavior becomes frequent,
leading henceforth to high levels of cooperation in a population sporting a rep-
resentative variety of playing strategies. Furthermore, an optimal prior com-
mitment participation level emerges, dependent both on the common goods
dilemma and on the cost of arranging commitment. In particular, the harsher
the dilemma and the costlier the commitment, the higher the required commit-
ment participation level to ensure the success of the joint venture. Addition-
ally, as a commitment deal may last for more than one round, we evince that
longer-lasting commitments require a greater strictness upon fake committers
than short ones.
The results we obtain are in close accordance with experimental economic
outcomes obtained by others (Cherry and McEvoy, 2013, Chen and Komorita,
1994). But the present work further reveals that, whenever the compensation
that needs to be paid by fake committers reaches a certain threshold, increasing
it does not lead to improvement in terms of cooperation levels. It implies that,
when designing norms, whether in real life or a self-organizing MAS, it is
not necessary to have an infinitely large compensation or sanction against law
breakers, for a sufficient one is enough for a wide range of situations. Moreover,
the current paper suggests the need for further behavioral experiments to
explore the effects of varying the essential parameters that drive commitments.
Finally, our work provides specific insights into the design of self-organizing
MAS when dealing with group interactions. For instance, in finding the effec-
tive degrees of commitment one should require from group members which
lead to highest levels of cooperation. Another instance concerns the use of
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commitment with a view to cooperation in lieu of intention recognition (Han
et al., 2011, 2012a, 2015a), when the latter is not reliable enough. Commit-
ment can be seen as a cogent form of intention manifestation, and achieving
joint intentions is an exclusive characteristic of the human species (Tomasello,
2014). Notwithstanding, as groups increase in size, intention recognition may
need to be supplemented by explicit intention commitment to ensure joint
success (Tomasello et al., 2005).
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A Some simplifications of the obtained analytical results
Here, using the well-known inequalities (Knuth, 2011)
logN + γ < FN =
N∑
k=1
1
k
≤ logN + 1
where γ = 0.577215, we provide some simplifications of the conditions obtained in the main
text. First of all, regarding the conditions for risk-dominance of COMPF against D, FREE
and FAKE:
 ≤ min
{
r + F −N − 1
HN −HF−1
,
r − 1
HN
}
× c,
δ ≥ N − r
NFN−1
c+
FN
NFN−1
.
(11)
They can be simplified to
 ≤ min
{
r + F −N − 1
log N
F−1 + γ − 1
,
r − 1
logN + γ
}
× c,
δ ≥ (N
2 − rN)c+ 
N2 (log(N − 1) + 1) +

N
.
(12)
B Risk-dominance conditions when N →∞
Note that the risk-dominance condition described in the Method section is valid for the large
population size limit (Z → ∞). We now analyze these conditions for N → ∞. We assume
that the multiplication factor r is a function of N , i.e. r(N).
From (12), if logN grows much faster than r(N) (or using little-o notation, r(N) =
o(logN)), i.e. if
lim
N→∞
r(N)
logN
= 0,
then the right-hand side of the first inequality in (12) becomes 0. It implies that when
N →∞ the cost of arranging the commitment must be infinitely small so that COMP can be
risk-dominant against defective strategies (namely, in this case, the FREE strategy). Hence,
provided that arranging commitment is costly ( > 0), it must hold that r(N) 6= o(logN),
or, using the big omega notation,
r(N) = Ω(logN)) (as N →∞). (13)
In this case, we have
 ≤ min
{
lim
N→∞
r(N) + F −N − 1
log N
F−1
, lim
N→∞
r(N)
logN
}
c (14)
Hence, the necessary condition for this inequality to hold is that r(N) = Ω(logN)) and 
grows at most as fast as
r(N)
logN
.
Consider now the second risk-dominance inequality
δ ≥ (N
2 − rN)c+ 
N2 (log(N − 1) + 1) +

N
. (15)
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If  is a constant, clearly the right hand side becomes 0 as N →∞, i.e. δ can be indefinitely
small while still ensuring the condition is satisfied (i.e. COMP is risk-dominant against
FAKE). Let’s assume that  is a function of N . Then, the same conclusion applies if
(N) = o(N).
Otherwise, i.e. if (N) = Ω(N), then the the inequality can be rewritten as
δ ≥ lim
N→∞
(
(N)
N2 (log(N − 1) + 1) +
(N)
N
)
. (16)
That is, roughly, δ needs to grow at least as fast as
(N)
N
when N → ∞ to guarantee risk-
dominance of COMP against FAKE. We also observe that the contribution cost c does not
play a role in determining the lower boundary of δ.
In short, as the group size N → ∞, the risk-dominance conditions are defined in (14)
and (16). For these to hold, it is necessary that
1. the multiplication factor r(N) satisfies that r(N) = Ω(logN)), i.e.
lim
N→∞
r(N)
logN
> 0
2. the cost of arranging commitment (N) grows at most as fast as
r(N)
logN
as N →∞
3. the compensation cost, δ(N) grows at least as fast as
(N)
N
when N →∞
C Results for varying group sizes
In Figure 7, we plot the total frequency of commitment strategies for varying  and δ, and
for increasing group sizes. The results show that the observations seen in the main text
are robust for varying group sizes N as well as compensation cost δ. Furthermore,  is the
essential parameter because as soon as δ reaches a certain threshold, increasing it does not
lead to notable improvement.
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Fig. 7 Results in the main text are robust for varying group size N . We plot the total
frequency of the commitment proposing strategies as a function of  and δ. In general, when
 is small enough and δ is sufficiently high, commitment proposing strategies are frequent,
leading to high levels of cooperation in the PGG. Parameters: Z = 100; r = 4; β = 0.25.
